Abstract

This research aims at studying the method of pledging of the moral thing under the rules of pledge in Islamic jurisprudence. Whereas these rules bind the pledger to deliver the pledged thing to the pledgee, this delivery may be concluded if the subject of the pledge is a tangible thing. Meanwhile, if the subject is a moral thing, such as a trademark or a patent, there are no rules to regulate how the delivery is done. So, a question arises: how the pledge is concluded? This study comes to examine the flexibility and the ability of the rules which were regulated by the classic Muslim jurists to regulate the delivery of the moral thing from the pledger to the pledgee. This study introduces an important result provides that the Islamic jurisprudence is unable to regulate this issue. However, the provisions of the Holley Qur'an and the prophetical traditions on which the classic Muslim jurists had depended to regulate the pledge are wide enough to cover the moral thing and regulate it as a subject matter in the pledge contract. Accordingly, these provisions show that the pledge in a moral thing is concluded via writing authentication, but not via delivery. This is mentioned in the Quranic provisions themselves.